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AN INTRODUCTION TO E-COMMERCE
¶1

Electronic commerce (e-commerce) refers to any commercial activity in which an
electronic communication medium plays a central role in the exchange of money for
goods and services.1 First made available to consumers in 1991, when the Internet
initially opened to commercial activity, the popularity of e-commerce among consumers
has grown gradually. As Internet-security technology continued to develop in the early
*

J.D., 2014, Northwestern University School of Law.
Michael S. H. Heng, Understanding Electronic Commerce from a Historical Perspective, 12
COMMC’NS OF THE ASS’N FOR INFO. SYS. 104, 105 (2003).
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nineties, enhanced website functionality enabled businesses to begin selling products
online.2 By 2012, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that e-commerce sales accounted for
approximately five percent of total retail sales.3 Today, companies such as Amazon and
Zappos generate astronomical sums of annual revenue and represent the pinnacle of
success for many entrepreneurs hoping to launch similar ideas on the Internet. Of these
many hopeful entrepreneurs, the people behind Rocket Internet (Rocket) are arguably the
most successful in building new companies based on existing business models.
German brothers—Oliver, Marc, and Alexander Samwer—are the topic of much
conversation among those interested in technology startups. Operating through their
startup incubator, Rocket Internet, the Samwers’ business model is simple: identify
existing, successful business models in the United States and imitate them internationally.
Claiming to be “execution” rather than “pioneer” entrepreneurs, the Samwer brothers
have successfully cloned Ebay, Airbnb, eHarmony, Pinterest, Amazon, and Zappos,
among others.4 Though the Samwers’ strategy is to operate these imitation websites in
foreign countries, and thus avoid going head-to-head with their American counterparts,
the Samwers often eventually sell the clones to the imitated companies.
Many entrepreneurs revile the Samwers as unimaginative concept thieves;
however, the Samwers maintain that there are many imitation websites, and that what sets
them apart is the efficient execution of the imitated ideas. Additionally, the Samwers
point out that many of the most popular technologies, such as Google, iPods, and
Facebook were clones of other, less successful products.5 Even technology giants like
Google and Apple were not the first to create the products that fueled their growth and
success. For example, despite what many may believe, Google was not the first Internet
search engine, and Apple did not invent the MP3 player, the touchscreen smartphone, or
the tablet computer.6 Oliver Samwer explains that “most innovations come on top of
other innovations,”7 and that their approach should be treated no differently than any
other invention that has improved upon preexisting technology.
This Comment first analyzes and discusses the successes of the Samwer brothers
and their startup incubator, Rocket Internet. It further evaluates why intellectual property
protection, specifically a business method patent, is not available to protect the business
ideas of the companies they clone. Lastly, this Comment explores whether intellectual
property protection should be offered to companies with novel and creative ideas, or
whether protection would retard, rather than promote, innovation.

2

History of Ecommerce, ECOMMERCE-LAND, http://www.ecommerce-land.com/history_ecommerce.
html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
3
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE: 2ND QUARTER 2012
(2012).
4
Caroline Winter, How Three Germans Are Cloning the Web, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 29,
2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-02-29/the-germany-website-copy-machine.
5
David Meyer, The Ethics of Cloning: Why ‘Original’ Isn’t Always Essential, GIGAOM (Sept. 3, 2012,
9:18 AM), http://gigaom.com/europe/the-ethics-of-cloning-why-original-isnt-always-essential/.
6
Id.; see Max Chafkin, Lessons from the World’s Most Ruthless Competitor, INC. MAGAZINE (May 29,
2012), http://www.inc.com/magazine/201206/max-chafkin/oliver-samwer-european-king-of-the-companycloners.html.
7
See Chafkin, supra note 6.
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I. A HISTORY OF ROCKET INTERNET AND THE SAMWER BROTHERS
¶5

¶6

The Samwer brothers conceived of the idea behind Rocket Internet in 1999, when
they noticed both the absence of an online auction site in the German marketplace and the
potential for one to succeed.8 Germany’s retail laws imposed harsh restrictions on retail
discounts, and the Samwers believed online auctions would allow consumers to
circumvent those laws.9 When Oliver, Marc, and Alexander’s efforts to pitch their ideas
to eBay’s executives were rebuffed, the brothers began developing their own online
auction site, Alando. Alando was incredibly successful, and just one hundred days after
going live, eBay purchased Alando from the Samwers for £35 million.10
Despite the success of Alando, the Samwers did not launch Rocket Internet, their
Berlin-based incubator, for eight years following Alando’s debut. The Samwers spent
that time investing in various German technology startups, all of which were based on
business models that had proven to be successful in the United States.11 These successes
led to the development of the Samwers’ own business model: imitate preexisting, highgrowth, U.S.-based Internet companies, launch these startups in foreign countries, and
often sell the company back to the imitated entity. This model is based on highly efficient
and ruthless execution, providing founders with operational assistance and access to
capital plus as little as 2–10% equity in their companies.12 Most of the equity in these
technology startups belongs to Rocket, with a substantial portion of the rest belonging to
investors.13 Many have criticized the Samwers’ approach, suggesting that they take
advantage of founders who are faced with choosing between receiving little equity in
their own company and not being able to start one at all.14
II. THE DEBATE: IS THIS ENTREPRENEURSHIP OR THEFT?

¶7

Oliver Samwer admits innovation is not the driving force behind Rocket Internet’s
business model. In an interview with Wired Magazine, Oliver Samwer discussed how
“[his] advantage is never that [he’s] the first . . . [his] advantage is that [Rocket] build[s]
faster and better in more instances than anyone else.”15 One of Rocket’s managing
directors, Alexander Kudlich, explains that while ideas are important, “innovation is
more than design and the first idea.”16 Florian Heinemann, another of Rocket’s managing
directors, describes innovation as something that happens “on a conceptual level, on an
idea level, but also on an operational level.”17 Both Kudlich and Heinemann emphasize
that the Samwers’ approach incorporates many of the elements and risks of
8

Matt Cowan, Inside the Clone Factory: The Story of Germany’s Samwer Brothers, WIRED (Mar. 2,
2012), http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2012/04/features/inside-the-clone-factory?page=all.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
See Chafkin, supra note 6.
13
Id.
14
Bernard Leong, Rocket Internet: Is There a Method to Its Madness or Is It Just Bad for Innovation,
TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 16, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/09/16/rocket-internet-is-there-a-method-to-itsmadness-or-is-it-just-bad-for-innovation/.
15
Cowan, supra note 8.
16
See Chafkin, supra note 6.
17
Cowan, supra note 8.
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entrepreneurship, including finding both structurally sustainable business models and the
right market to enter, and hiring the right staff to run the operation.18
It is the position of the Samwers, and a small minority of entrepreneurs, that they
should reap the rewards of the risks they take in implementing the ideas of others.19
Additionally, the Samwers emphasize the importance of idea execution for their success.
Business incubators such as Team Europe, Springstar, Atlantic Ventures, and Found Fair
are all examples of “Samwer wannabes,” or entrepreneurs that hope to imitate existing
business models in different markets.20 However, these fledgling incubators cannot begin
to match the accomplishments of Rocket, which boasts a success rate of between 70 and
80 percent for all investments.21 Oliver Samwer’s colleagues attribute Rocket’s success to
his discipline, hard work, and tendency to work “until he wins.”22 This diligence and
tenacity enabled Rocket to create successful international clones of Square, Fab, Zappos,
and Amazon in less than six months.23
Despite the incredible success of Rocket Internet and the Samwers thus far, the
sustainability of their business model has recently been called into question.24 Some in
the startup industry predict the eventual collapse of the empire the Samwers have built.25
While many have praised the Samwers’ emphasis on business-strategy execution, Rocket
is shutting down some of their operations due to poor returns. Ironically, those who have
examined the few failures of the Samwers suggest their excellence in execution could be
the cause of their downfall, rather than their success.26 Where the Samwers excel at
pouring time, energy, and resources into developing the IT platforms and operations of
existing businesses, they are considerably less successful at implementing the customer
service aspects of these companies.27 Zappos is known for its “customer-centric” culture,
which requires not only the right personnel, but also the continued commitment from its
leaders to internally cultivate this culture.28 As such, critics suggest Rocket’s Zappos
clone, Zalora, is failing due to its customer-service shortcomings, noting that excellent
customer service is “not something that you can do within three months using a
spreadsheet.”29

18

See id.; see also Chafkin, supra note 6.
See Chafkin, supra note 6.
20
See id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See Leong, supra note 14.
25
Id.
26
See id. (“[T]hey are excellent in execution of launching new Internet companies whether—web
services or e-commerce companies—but fall short in building businesses with real value. That’s why we
are hearing so many bad reports, and mainly in the space of customer complaints.”).
27
Id.; see Colin Charles, My Take on Rocket Internet, COLIN CHARLES AGENDA (May 9, 2012),
http://www.bytebot.net/blog/archives/2012/09/05/my-take-on-rocket-internet.
28
See Leong, supra note 14.
29
Id.
19
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III. DOES A HISTORY OF IMITATION EXIST IN TECHNOLOGY?
¶10

Many entrepreneurs, even those that disparage the Samwers’ business methods,
admit that derivative ideas are the basis of innovation.30 In fact, much of intellectual
property law centers on the idea that protection of intellectual property must be on
balance with encouraging innovation. Oliver Samwer claims that “most innovations come
on top of other innovations,”31 evidence of which is found in the history of America’s
biggest technology trends. For example, as mentioned previously, Google was not the
first search engine, and Apple did not invent the MP3 player, the touchscreen
smartphone, or the tablet computer.32 The Samwers argue that the development of startup
clones merely creates competition for online retailers, which benefits any healthy
marketplace.33
¶11
In fact, technology’s progression enables such effective imitation. As technology
has continued to develop, the pace of imitation has increased substantially.34 As Professor
Oded Shenkar of Ohio State University points out: “[A] successful Internet startup can be
knocked off in an afternoon. Most will be knocked off in a matter of months.”35
However, despite both the history of cloning in the technology field and the efforts of
other entrepreneurs to copy the Samwers’ business model, many still view the Samwers
as merely “clone kings”—intellectual property thieves without original ideas.36
IV. WHAT KIND OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IS
AVAILABLE FOR INNOVATORS?
A. Trade Dress
Rocket invested in StudiVZ, the German imitation of Facebook.37 In 2009,
Facebook sued StudiVZ for trade dress infringement, alleging a substantial degree of
visual and functional similarity to Facebook’s user interface.38 Facebook was ultimately
unsuccessful in German courts, and settled outside of American courts.39 This case
illustrates the high standards courts impose for proving trade dress infringement.
¶13
Trade dress has been defined as “the total image of a product, [which] include[s]
features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even
particular sales techniques.”40 Under the Lanham Act, to prevail on a claim for trade
dress infringement, a plaintiff must prove:
¶12

30

See Cowan, supra note 8.
Chafkin, supra note 6.
32
Meyer, supra note 5; see also Chafkin, supra note 6.
33
Chafkin, supra note 6.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Cowan, supra note 8.
38
Facebook, Inc. v. Studivz Ltd., No. C 08-3468 JF (HRL), 2009 WL 1190802, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 4,
2009).
39
See Justin Smith, Facebook Settles Suit Against StudiVZ, but Germans Already Moving to Facebook
Anyways, INSIDE FACEBOOK (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.insidefacebook.com/2009/09/10/facebooksettles-suit-against-studivz-but-germans-already-moving-to-facebook-anyway.
40
John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983); see SK & F Co. v.
Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (D.N.J. 1979) (stating that “[t]rade dress is a complex
31
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1. The trade dress of the two products is confusingly similar,
2. The features of the trade dress are primarily nonfunctional, and
3. The trade dress has acquired secondary meaning.41
¶14

Although the court acknowledged that the design of a website could be eligible for
trade dress protection, Facebook’s design was not eligible because the design was simple
and not highly remarkable.42 An analysis of trade dress protection suggests that while
some companies may be able to protect the “packaging” of their ideas, suing under a
theory of trade dress infringement will not protect the underlying business model.
B. Trade Secrets

¶15

Trade secrets represent another form of intellectual property protection that
innovators could potentially pursue to protect their business concepts. Broadly speaking,
a trade secret is “any confidential business information that provides an enterprise a
competitive edge.”43 This confidential business information could include, among other
types of confidential proprietary information, formulas, recipes, sales and marketing
strategies, and manufacturing information.44 However, taking into account the ease by
which imitators can reverse engineer websites, even without any proprietary information
from the original site, trade secrets seem to have little place in the Internet-startup field.45
¶16
Further, while most states have enacted laws fashioned at least in part after the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which provides a legal framework for the improved
protection of trade secrets within the United States,46 e-commerce proprietors wishing to
protect their trade secrets from extraterritorial misappropriation usually lack federal
protection.47 Before Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA),
advocates for federal protection of trade secrets argued that a federal law would facilitate
trade secret protection in international trade—an area of uniquely federal concern.48 Yet
even after the EEA’s adoption, multinational companies face great difficulty in protecting
trade secrets internationally. Because of the EEA’s limited extraterritorial reach, a U.S.based company will likely be unable to bring a cause of action for trade secret
misappropriation against a foreign company, unless “an act in furtherance of the offense
composite of features” including, inter alia, size, color, texture, and graphics, which must “be considered
together, not separately”), aff'd, 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980).
41
John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 980 (quoting Black & Decker Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg.
Co., 518 F. Supp. 607, 616 (E.D. Mo. 1981), aff’d, 684 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1982)); see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(2012).
42
Facebook, 2009 WL 1190802, at *1.
43
What Is a Trade Secret?, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/trade_secrets.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
44
Id.
45
See Chafkin, supra note 6.
46
See Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 427,
432 n.17, 433 (1995).
47
See id. at 442; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (applying only to companies incorporated in the United
States, or in the alternative, to domestic acts in furtherance of an applicable offense).
48
Pace, supra note 46, at 449.
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was committed in the United States.”49 Because of this domestic-conduct requirement,
federal trade secret protection is especially limited for e-commerce.
¶17
Although the United States has entered into various international trade agreements,
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), these agreements only
mandate that signatory nations provide a minimal level of protection for intellectual
property existing within their borders.50 In the end, this minimal level of foreign
protection does not make up for the EEA’s extraterritorial limitations, making trade
secret protection an inadequate remedy for those wishing to combat imitation startups.
C. Copyright
¶18

While the individual expression of an author’s ideas is copyrightable, the
underlying idea is not eligible for copyright protection.51 Courts have recognized that
copyright law protects computer programs and software as “literary works,”52 but it is
unclear whether a website would fit into the category of copyrightable expression. As the
court explained in Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,
Those aspects of a work, which “must necessarily be used as incident to”
the idea, system or process that the work describes, are . . . not
copyrightable. . . . [Therefore] those elements of a computer program that
are necessarily incidental to its function are similarly unprotectable.53
Under that theory, the ideas, systems, and processes underlying the computer program, or
in this case a website, are not copyrightable, and neither are those aspects that are
necessary to its function.54 Further, applying the court’s “abstraction test,” which
distinguishes idea from expression,55 it is relatively clear that while the design elements
of a website are copyrightable expression, the underlying business idea is not.
D. Business Method Patent

¶19

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) recognizes three types of
patents: utility patents, design patents, and plant patents.56 Business method patents are
categorized as utility patents, which the USPTO grants to “anyone who invents or
discovers any new process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter, or

49

18 U.S.C. § 1837(2) (1996).
Pace, supra note 46, at 450.
51
See JULIE COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 215 (3d ed. 2010).
52
Id.
53
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704–05 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)).
54
Id.
55
See id. at 706–07.
56
Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/index.jsp (last visited
Oct. 11, 2014).
50
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any new and useful improvement thereof.”57 Additionally, a business method must be
novel, useful, and nonobvious to qualify for patent protection.58
V. THE EXPANSION OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
¶20

Prior to the court’s decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group, Inc., the USPTO generally considered methods of doing business not to be
patentable subject matter.59 The USPTO first discussed the patentability of business
methods in 1869, when bookkeeping methods were considered “contrary to the spirit of
the patent law construed by the Office,” and thus unpatentable.60 The “business-methodexception doctrine,” which described business methods as ineligible for patent protection,
arose out of dicta in Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine. There, since the subject
matter of the claims—a system of bookkeeping—was clearly not a “machine,
manufacture or composition of matter,” the court concluded that the system must
therefore qualify as a “new and useful art” to be patentable. The court then noted, “A
system of transacting business disconnected from the means for carrying out the system
is not, within the most liberal interpretation of the term, an art.”61 From this, the
foundation of the business-method-exception doctrine—that business methods are per se
unpatentable—was born.
A. The 1980s

¶21

But as technology developed in the United States, the scope of patentable subject
matter correspondingly expanded.62 Reaching its apex in the 1980s, this judicial trend
resulted in a number of decisions providing a more liberal basis for determining what
constitutes statutorily patentable subject matter.63 For instance, in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, the United States Supreme Court broadly construed “Inventions Patentable”
to “‘include anything under the sun that is made by man,’” with the exception of “laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”64 However, the Court did not address
the issue of whether business methods are subject to patent protection.65
¶22
With limited Supreme Court guidance, a Delaware District Court confronted the
business-method-exception doctrine in Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Incorporated v.

57

Id.
Daniel A. Tysver, Patent Requirements, BITLAW, http://www.bitlaw.com/patent/requirements.html
(last visited Oct. 11, 2014).
59
MIKU MEHTA & LAURA MOSKOWITZ, SUGHRUE MION, PLLC, BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES: A JUDICIAL HISTORY & PROSECUTION PRACTICE 5 (2012), available at
http://www.sughrue.com/files/publication/54011fba-0904-4dfe-83afe5c4b0d1c538/presentation/publicationattachment/5869b571-51c7-451b-bbd1ed552fe8edc6/businessmethodpatentsaippiprosprac.pdf; see State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin.
Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
60
MEHTA & MOSKOWITZ, supra note 59, at 2 (quoting Ex parte Abraham, Dec. Comm’r Pat. 59 (1869)).
61
Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine, 60 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908).
62
MEHTA & MOSKOWITZ, supra note 59, at 5.
63
Id.
64
447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H. R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6
(1952)).
65
See generally id.
58
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Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated.66 The district court held that
although the disputed patent included a business method, the business-method-exception
doctrine did not invalidate the patent because the business method was performed by a
computer, rather than by hand.67 While this narrow application of the business-methodexception doctrine did not explicitly confront the issue of business method patentability,
it nevertheless highlights the necessary evolution of traditional legal principles in light of
modern innovation.
B. The 1990s
¶23

Though the courts expanded the scope of patentable subject matter throughout the
1980s, no case directly addressed the patentability of business methods.68 However, a
series of cases during the 1990s, all relating to computer software, resulted in the further
expansion of patentable subject matter.69 These cases ultimately served as the precursor
for the eventual inclusion of business methods in the realm of patentable subject matter.
¶24
In 1994, the Federal Circuit decided the first of these cases, In re Alappat.70 The
court determined that the practical application of a mathematical algorithm qualified as a
useful, concrete, and tangible result when applied in a machine that produced a smooth,
waveform display on a digital oscilloscope.71 Similarly, in In re Lowry, the Federal
Circuit held that a data-processing system, utilized for the storage, use, and management
of information in computer memory, was patentable subject matter.72 And only one year
later, the Federal Circuit in In re Beauregard73 determined that computer programs
constitute patentable subject matter as articles of manufacture, as long as the claim
involves a computer-readable medium accompanied by instructions for causing a
particular computer operation.74 In other words, if software involves a computer-readable
medium and has instructions for causing a specific result, it should be considered an
article of manufacture, and is therefore patentable under § 101.75
VI. THE EXPANSION OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER TO INCLUDE BUSINESS METHODS
¶25

The Federal Circuit’s series of decisions in the mid-1990s vastly expanded the
scope of patentable subject matter. However, much like the series of cases in the 1980s,
these cases failed to address whether business methods, independent of a computerreadable medium or data carrier, are patentable under § 101.76 In 1998, the Federal
Circuit finally directly addressed the issue of business method patentability in State Street

66

564 F. Supp. 1358, 1369 (D. Del. 1983).
Id.
68
MEHTA & MOSKOWITZ, supra note 59, at 5.
69
Id.
70
33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
71
Id.
72
32 F.3d 1579, 1584–85 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
73
53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
74
See id.; see also MEHTA & MOSKOWITZ, supra note 59, at 6.
75
MEHTA & MOSKOWITZ, supra note 59, at 6.
76
Id.
67
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Bank & Trust Company v. Signature Financial Group, Incorporated.77 Following State
Street, several influential case decisions provided further guidance in determining both
the scope of the business method patent and the applicable test for business method
patentability.
A. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. (1998)
¶26

In State Street, the Federal Circuit held that business methods are patentable if they
produce a concrete and tangible result.78 The business method at issue involved the
transformation of data through a series of mathematical calculations that produced a
result. Because it created a useful, concrete, and tangible result, the business method
constituted a patentable practical application of a mathematical algorithm.79
¶27
Following State Street, patents were no longer limited to physical embodiments.
Business methods could qualify for patent protection as long as they met the procedural
and substantive requirements of patentability.80 However, because the business method in
State Street involved a machine performing a business method through the use of a
mathematical algorithm, the business method was considered a statutory machine under
§ 101.81 Therefore, while the State Street opinion rendered the business-method-exception
doctrine obsolete, the patent in question referred only to business methods claimed as
statutory machines.82 As a result, it was still unclear whether patent protection extended
to a business method as process claim not involving a statutory machine.83
¶28
In response to State Street, the USPTO began granting patent applications for
everything from simple software features, such as Amazon’s “One-Click” system, to
exceedingly broad methods, such as the “process of exercising a cat with a laser
pointer.”84 Many who were opposed to making business methods eligible for patent
protection viewed the State Street decision as “an example of judicial activism that
introduced patents into a field where patenting was unwanted and unnecessary.”85
Overall, the State Street opinion has been widely criticized as “a source of increasing and
expensive litigation, especially in Internet applications,” due to the flood of new patents
entering the market, many of which being extremely broad in scope.86

77

Id. at 7; State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373.
79
Id.
80
See Larry Downes, Supreme Court Hedges on Business Method Patents, CNET (June 28, 2010),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20009046-38.html (discussing that the procedural and substantive
requirements for patents provide that the proposed invention must be novel, useful, and not obvious).
81
See MEHTA & MOSKOWITZ, supra note 59, at 7–8.
82
Id. at 7.
83
Id.
84
Downes, supra note 80 (“A patent was even granted for the process of receiving a patent.”); see
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B. AT&T v. Excel Communications (1999)
¶29

In AT&T v. Excel, the Federal Circuit again decided a case that involved the
patenting of a business method, this time clarifying that a business method is patentable
as a process, not just as a statutory machine, under § 101.87 The court found that a process
that brings about a useful, concrete, and tangible result is patentable under § 101, despite
the fact that it does not involve a physical transformation.88
C. In re Bilski (2008)

Relying on Diamond v. Diehr,89 the In re Bilski court sought to determine whether
a patent applicant’s method of hedging risk in commodities trading was a fundamental
principle.90 The court distinguished patent applicants seeking to preempt the use of
fundamental principles from those seeking patents to do the same, but as a step in a
particular process.91 Ultimately, the court sought to determine whether granting the patent
would preempt all uses of the fundamental principle.92
¶31
In deciding whether the risk-hedging method was patentable subject matter, the
court reaffirmed the use of the “machine-or-transformation” test.93 This test defines
patentable subject matter under § 101 as something that (1) is tied to a particular machine
or apparatus, or (2) transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.94
Applying the machine-or-transformation test, the court rejected the patent because the
method was neither tied to a particular machine nor did it affect any transformation of
matter in the physical world.95 With this decision, the In re Bilski court also rejected the
“useful, concrete, and tangible result test,” applied in both In re Alappat96 and State
Street,97 in favor of the machine-or-transformation test.
¶32
Many viewed the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Bilski as an abrogation of State
Street.98 The use of the machine-or-transformation test in lieu of the “useful, concrete,
and tangible result” test would strictly limit the patentability of business methods, and
would “sharply circumscribe[] the availability of patent protection for most software
claims.”99 Many feared that the exclusive application of the machine-or-transformation
test would have “gutted [the patent system] . . . and put up too many hurdles to getting
¶30
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anything patented.”100 However, fortunately for proponents of business method patents,
Supreme Court intervention loomed on the horizon.
D. Bilski v. Kappos (2010)
¶33

In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court reexamined the risk-hedging business
method’s patentability. While the Court upheld the patentability of business methods
generally,101 it determined that the applicants’ business method was an abstract
investment strategy, which did not constitute patentable subject matter.102 Most
importantly, the Court additionally held that the machine-or-transformation test should
not be the sole test for determining patent eligibility of a process, despite the Federal
Circuit’s ruling in In re Bilski.103 The Court explained that the machine-or-transformation
test is “a useful and important clue, an investigative tool for determining whether some
claimed inventions are processes under § 101.”104 However, the use of the machine-ortransformation test as the exclusive means in determining what constitutes a “process,” as
opposed to merely an important indicator, contradicted the statutory interpretation
principles of § 101 set forth in prior Supreme Court decisions.105
¶34
The Court cited the development of the “Information Age” as the reason that the
machine-or-transformation test is no longer adequate as the sole indicator of what
constitutes a patentable process.106 Considering the advancements in “software, advanced
diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions based on linear programming, data
compression, and the manipulation of digital signals,” the machine-or-transformation test
would create uncertainty as to the patentability of these innovations.107 For a process to
be eligible for a patent, the machine-or-transformation test requires an innovator to have
implemented the process with a particular machine, specifically devised and adapted to
carry out such process, in neither a conventional nor trivial manner; or in the alternative,
that the process transforms an article from one thing or state to another.108 Because many
software innovations are only tenuously tied to a particular machine, the implementation
of the machine-or-transformation test as the exclusive means of determining patentability
would not only create vast uncertainty as to what is patentable, but potentially “force[]
[the lower courts] to wipe out many, many patents.”109
¶35
The Court’s decision implicitly endorsed less stringent standards for business
method patents.110 The unknown and potentially widespread repercussions of imposing a
high threshold for business method patentability likely contributed to the majority’s stare
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decisis-based holding.111 For instance, the indirect impact on the U.S. economy caused by
the mass invalidation of patents might be severe. Further, stringent standards might
stymie U.S. innovation. Michael Bednarek, of Axinn Veltrop Harkrider LLP, predicts
that denying patents to many of the entrepreneurs innovating in the fields of medical and
computer technology would discourage those innovators from creating their products,
and “would [therefore] help foreign economies at [the United States’] own expense.”112
¶36
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari, many hoped this meant the Court
wished to create a higher bar for business method patents, or perhaps, to eliminate them
entirely.113 However, while the Court held the method of hedging weather-based risk in
commodities trading to be too abstract to be patentable, it also “ratcheted back the ruling
of the Federal Circuit, possibly making business method patents easier to receive than
they were before.”114 Some argue that the Court’s ruling in Bilski v. Kappos, while
undoubtedly pro-patent, provides little guidance as to how lower courts should determine
what constitutes patentable subject matter.115 Regardless, many favor judicial discretion
in this context, especially those involved in e-commerce. For instance, according to John
Biernacki, a partner at Jones Day, district courts “were using the Federal Circuit’s ruling
to strike down a lot of patents, especially those pertaining to e-commerce. Patentees and
courts now will have greater latitude.”116
VII.

WHY DO COMPANIES DECLINE TO SEEK PATENT PROTECTION FOR THEIR
BUSINESS METHODS?

¶37

Since the 1998 ruling in State Street, a number of companies have sought patent
protection for certain business methods, many of which combine software with a business
strategy. For example, Amazon obtained a patent on its “1-Click” purchase feature, a
method the company developed for expediting online purchases in 1997.117 Granted in
1999, this patent “protects any E-commerce transaction executed with one-click using
stored customer credentials to validate.”118
¶38
The patent has allowed Amazon to develop an extremely effective checkout
system, providing a “frictionless” process in which the purchaser need not fill out credit
card and shipping information.119 Though this streamlined purchasing system would
likely benefit many online retailers, all such retailers are precluded from using this
technology without a license because of the broad patent granted to Amazon.
Considering the value stemming from the 1-Click patent, one might wonder why Amazon
has not sought protection for its overall business concept. For instance, startup incubators

111
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like Rocket have already created imitations of Amazon in Jakarta called “Lazada,” and
one in Istanbul called “Mizado.”120
¶39
Section 101 defines patent-eligible subject matter in “expansive terms . . . as the
statute was meant to ensure that ‘ingenuities receive a liberal encouragement.’”121
However, while § 101 sets forth broad patent eligibility principles, judicial precedent has
outlined three specific exemptions barring patent eligibility: laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas.122
¶40
In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court held that the concept of hedging was an
unpatentable abstract idea.123 Relying on Gottschalk v. Benson, the Court emphasized that
“a principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these
cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”124 The
Court reasoned that allowing Bilski to patent risk hedging would preclude others, even in
different fields, from using this basic economic principle, and would therefore grant a
monopoly over an abstract idea.125 Thus, existing precedent likely bars companies, such
as Amazon, eBay, and Zappos, from patenting their business methods because of the
abstract-idea exception.
¶41
The business concepts of online auctioning and retail are fundamental principles.
Allowing Amazon to patent its overall business method would essentially preclude other
online retailers from conducting business, and in so doing, would grant Amazon a
monopoly over a broad and abstract idea. Though many might scorn the Samwers as
“Clone Kings,” in practice they are simply creating competition in the marketplace.126
Competing businesses frequently enter new markets, prompting the original company to
provide consumers with better merchandise, discounts, or customer service—or risk
going out of business. The same principle applies to online retailers: simply because
Amazon created its business concept online does not mean they deserve more protection
than the brick-and-mortar shop owner.
A. Consider the Arguments Against Business Method Patents
¶42

If companies were allowed to patent abstract business ideas, this practice would
contradict a clear constitutional mandate. The Constitution provides that patents are to be
administered “to promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts,”127 and requires a “balance
between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle
competition without any concomitant advance [in Science or the useful Arts].”128
¶43
In Bilski v. Kappos, Justices Stevens, concurring in the judgment and joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, suggested that business method patents might
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not necessarily encourage business innovation.129 Given that the competitive marketplace
favors entities that use effective and efficient business methods, Justice Stevens noted,
“[C]ompanies have ample incentives to develop business methods even without patent
protection.”130 Moreover, Justice Stevens discussed how granting patents for business
methods potentially stifles progress rather than promotes it,131 as overly broad patent
protection can “discourage research by impeding the free exchange of information.”132
Faced with time-consuming and expensive research, complex licensing arrangements,
and potential liability for patent infringement, broad business method patents might
dissuade innovators and entrepreneurs from developing their business ideas.133
Categorically rejecting the patentability of business methods, Justice Stevens further
noted that if business methods could be patented, almost any business decision, even
minor judgments, could potentially amount to patent infringement.134
¶44
Both the overly broad scope of business method patents and the ambiguity
surrounding what constitutes patentable subject matter for a business method have
prompted criticism of the continued judicial recognition of such patents. Some argue,
[P]atent laws are not intended to “create a class of speculative schemers
who make it their business to watch the advancing wave of improvement
and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable
them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without
contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts.”135
¶45

Though under Bilski v. Kappos the business method patent still lives, courts have
historically disagreed on both the necessity of business method patents to protect
innovation and the danger that such patents pose to further innovation.136 Additionally,
one can make the argument that these imitation businesses actually benefit the global
economy. One of the major contributions of startup incubators like Rocket is their ability
to bring beneficial business concepts to the developing world, where online retailers
offering goods at discounted prices do not already exist. Should those countries have to
wait and hope that Amazon or eBay decide to expand into their markets? It seems only
fair to allow entrepreneurs to fill needs in untapped markets. In other words, many
believe that “this conversation about clones being bad loses sight of the fact that it is
building the next generation of entrepreneurs.”137
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B. In Defense of the Samwers
¶46

Though it is understandable that innovation and new ideas are highly regarded in
the entrepreneurial world, to say that the Samwers are not entrepreneurs or innovators
denies them credit for their myriad accomplishments. Well before founding Rocket
Internet in 2007, the Samwers devised a novel business strategy, meticulously researched
countries and demographics that might respond well to particular ideas, and implemented
those ideas with a remarkably high success rate.138 While businesses understandably lack
appreciation for such competition, the Samwers create markets that are both accessible to
once-forgotten consumers and not dominated by large corporate monopolies. Despite the
sentiments of some—that Oliver, Marc, and Alexander Samwer are merely copycats in an
age that reveres technological innovation—the Samwers are driving the proliferation of
technological innovation and the benefits thereof, which critics often fail to realize. If
other entrepreneurs were to imitate the Samwers’ business strategy and execution, rather
than revile it as unoriginal, perhaps more businesses would flourish, and in so doing,
would create a more competitive and dynamic marketplace.
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